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Abstract
In this paper, we explore the idea that indepen-
dently developed Dynamic Syntax accounts of
dialogue and interaction fit well within the gen-
eral approach of radical embodied and enac-
tive accounts of cognition (REEC). Taking this
approach enables a rethinking of the ground-
ing of linguistic universal constraints, specifi-
cally tree structure restrictions, as the outcome
of affordance competition, a general REEC so-
ciocognitive mechanism underpinning action
selection. In light of this subsumption, we ar-
gue that such an approach opens up a whole
new area of language-related dynamic systems
research.
Gregoromichelaki et al. (2019) claim that, in
virtue of modelling natural languages (NLs) as ac-
tions licensing context to context transitions, Dy-
namic Syntax (DS) fits well within radical em-
bodied and enactive accounts of cognition (REEC)
(Bruineberg et al., 2018; Paolo et al., 2018). How-
ever, major trends within REEC still remain un-
derdeveloped with respect to the fine-grained de-
tails of NL-related issues, a lacuna which Gre-
goromichelaki et al. argue that DS naturally cov-
ers. This paper addresses a putative counterexam-
ple to the REEC general claim of the dispensabil-
ity of standard representational assumptions and
the primacy of action. It concerns a robust struc-
tural constraint said to hold of all NLs (Kempson
et al., 2016 a.o). We argue that such a restriction
does not necessitate a representational explanation
and can be seen instead as grounded in a combi-
nation of socio-cognitive constraints and general
properties of dynamical systems.
1 Syntax and universals
Dynamic Syntax, as set out in Kempson et al.
(2001); Cann et al. (2005) and much other work
since, is a grammar architecture whose core ba-
sis is incremental integration of the contribution
of word sequences within a surrounding landscape
of affordances. Affordances, under this perspec-
tive, are relations between possibilities for action
provided by the environment (including the so-
cial milieu) and abilities available in a ‘form of
life’ (Rietveld and Kiverstein, 2014 a.o.). Within
this view, we take the grammar as an integral part
of the sociocognitive environment into which hu-
mans are enculturated via natural dialogue and
interaction. Thus the grammar is not seen as
qualitatively different to other constraints influ-
encing environment-engaging behaviour patterns
of individuals and groups in the achievement of
their aims and goals. It is of course possible
to reify these processes of linguistic engagement
with the world and assign them abstract struc-
ture formulated in representational terms, like the
standard grammatical models postulated by lin-
guists. Indeed, folk theories of language and
thought (at least in some societies) undeniably pos-
sess such conceptions of what language is, and we
do not doubt that such conceptualisations affect
the way people act with respect to their linguistic
behaviour. However, we believe that such concep-
tions are neither basic, nor universal, instead, they
constitute further affordances available in partic-
ular social groups for engaging with the available
resources and constraining relevant action possibil-
ities.
Grammar – which for us includes what are
standardly distinguished as syntax and seman-
tics/pragmatics – constrains human (inter)action
by providing a source of normativity, of what
is right or wrong, of what makes sense or not,
relative to particular social practices. For this
reason, grammar is not a construct encapsulated
within an individual brain or mind. Following
Wittgenstein’s well-known arguments against the
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existence of “private languages” and an interpreta-
tive conception of rule-following, we assume that
normativity constraints apply within a public do-
main of expression (even in cases where we pri-
vately rehearse responses to a simulation of such
interactional challenges in the public domain). In
the REEC affordance literature, a distinction is
made between individual abilities which are non-
representational capacities allowing individuals to
perceive and pick up what opportunities and re-
strictions are available in their sociomaterial envi-
ronment and affordances which exist within prac-
tices or ‘forms of life’ independently of any par-
ticular individual agent. Grammars, in our view,
operate at the level of regulating actions in prac-
tices, both linguistic and non-verbal, and, for this
reason, are part of the public landscape of affor-
dances available to interacting agents in each par-
ticular case of engagement with the environment.
Whether agents interact solely with the physical
environment or with other agents, their actions
(which constitute their conceptualisations) are en-
abled and restricted by normative constraints that
are imposed by the various cultural groups they in-
habit or wish to associate with. Due to member-
ship in various such cultural groups, in each oc-
casion of engagement, agents’ actions in turn “en-
act” and hence modify or enrich the normative con-
straints available in the practice. Words, both as
forms and meanings, and syntactic constructions
are established patterns of actions that can be fit-
ted in across various ‘language games’ to enact the
nature of the current activity subject to normative
judgements emanating from sources outside the
acting agent. This results in a system constantly
in flux but with enough emergent stability on each
particular occasion to underpin agent coordination
in the service of various purposes.
In accordance with these assumptions, the DS
syntactic engine, including the lexicon, is artic-
ulated in terms of goal-driven actions (see also
(van Benthem, 2011) accomplished either by giv-
ing rise to expectations of further action opportuni-
ties, by exploiting contextual resources, or by be-
ing abandoned as unviable in view of more com-
petitive alternatives. Thus words, syntax, and
morphology are all modelled as affordances, op-
portunities for (inter-)action, produced and recog-
nised by interlocutors to perform step-by-step
coordinated mappings from perceivable stimuli
(phonological strings) to concept-constituting ac-
tion patterns (routines, macros) or vice-versa (Gre-
goromichelaki et al., 2019).
The substance of the DS framework is given by
a specialised dynamic modal logic (PDL, Proposi-
tional Dynamic Logic) whose state-transition lan-
guage describes a process of gradual unfolding
of a diagrammatically laid out relational structure
modelling the landscape of salient affordances as
a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). DAG nodes are
in turn structured states modelling potential inter-
pretations/productions. Interpretation or produc-
tion relies on the process of potential traversal
and gradual enrichment of local graph structures
in the form of trees. Such traversals are possi-
ble by means of specialised modal operators that
follow paths restricted to characterisations of (par-
tial) tree structures. The latter are models of sets
of constraints articulated within the logic of finite
trees (LOFT, Blackburn and Meyer-Viol, 1994).
Each node of a tree-structure model is in turn in-
habited by graphs resembling feature structures
whose attributes are modelled by modal opera-
tors bearing linguistically relevant labels like type,
hTyi, treenode address, hTni, and hFoi for con-
tent. In current versions of DS, content values
are Record Types (henceforth RT) of Type Theory
with Records (TTR, Cooper and Ginzburg, 2015)
under construction whose inherent underspecifica-
tion fits well the potential for indefinite enrichment
across various dimensions (Eshghi et al., 2013;
Hough, 2015; Purver et al., 2011). RTs (standing
for “concepts”) can in turn be conceived as mini-
grammars of the DS kind articulating affordances
for engagement with aspects of the environment
(Gregoromichelaki et al., 2019), or potential for
interaction with others (Eshghi et al., 2017; Es-
hghi and Lemon, 2014). Alternatively, Sadrzadeh
et al. (2018) show how combining a Vector Space
Semantics methodology with DS can model incre-
mental construction of ad hoc concepts to resolve
issues of ambiguity and underspecification.
In both these approaches, DAGs map out the
potential transitions globally available for selec-
tion in a particular context of interaction while, lo-
cally, at each DAG node (Interaction Control State,
ICS), the potential constructions and transitions
are expressed by LOFT descriptions that obey
tree axiomatisation principles. As DS is a model-
theoretic formalism (Pullum and Scholz, 2001),
all the inferential activity modelling incremental
parsing/production is defined at the level of con-
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straints articulated through the vocabulary of the
relevant logics. The transformation of such PDL
and LOFT descriptions is accomplished via gen-
eral and lexicon-driven mappings expressed as pat-
terns of established and relatively stable sequences
of basic actions (macros). Such macros effect the
progressive projection of content, i.e., further op-
portunities for action, for emergent tree-structured
trajectories following the time-linear order of pre-
sentation of a linguistic string. The tree-structured
paths traversed by means of the LOFT modal op-
erators, reflect the structuring of physical and cog-
nitive actions that take place during linguistic pro-
cessing. Some of the outcomes of such actions
can be reified as predicate-argument structures by
assuming an external, God’s eye, non-modal-logic
point of view that abstracts from the process of in-
ducing and traversing such structures. This is a
useful and often needed perspective, both for the-
ory construction and for practical human purposes
like teaching, metalinguistic reflection and many
others but, in our view, it should not obscure the
most basic subpersonal level of processing from
which it emerges.
Bringing this framework to bear on current
views within REEC, Gregoromichelaki et al.
(2019) claim that DS is compatible with a view
of NLs as activities, “languaging”, rather than
manipulation of knowledge structures that define
arbitrary mappings from sound to propositional
symbolic representations. This is because DS ar-
ticulates state-transition mechanisms relative to
an ever-evolving context without needing to at-
tribute finalised and fixed contents to sentence
strings. Crucial in this perspective is incorporating
in the formal framework the social normativity ex-
pressed by the grammar. The native incremental-
ity and action-orientation of DS, as demonstrated
by Kempson et al. (2016) amongst others, is well-
suited to implement the fine-grained modelling
of conversational dialogue dynamics, in particular
the wholly fluent manner in which co-participants
in a dialogue switch roles, share utterance respon-
sibility, or effect repair.
Against the non-representational claims of (Gre-
goromichelaki et al., 2019), one might argue that
despite adopting the relatively broad concept of
affordances, following Bruineberg et al. (2018),
with all macros (lexical and general) seen as man-
ifest affordances, DS necessarily needs to also in-
voke representations, thus conflicting with funda-
mental REEC assumptions. This is because syntax
appears to be defined as tree and graph develop-
ment procedures in a manner similar to generative-
enumerative frameworks like CCG and Minimal-
ism (Pullum and Scholz, 2001). Indeed, among
other apparent representational features of DS
mechanisms, in particular, it has been argued in
major support of the framework that the abandon-
ment of universal constraints on structure urged by
some (Christiansen and Chater, 2008; Evans and
Levinson, 2009; Bybee, 2010; Haspelmath, 2020)
can be reversed by the shift to a dynamical system
that operates with partial trees and their incremen-
tal introduction. This is because universal struc-
tural constraints can be shown to hold due to the
inferential principles of LOFT, the constraint artic-
ulation basis of describing tree graph transitions in
DS. In particular, it is argued (Cann et al. (2005);
Kempson et al. (2016) a.o) that all licensed par-
tial tree-shaped trajectories are subject to a univer-
sal structural constraint prohibiting more than one
token of any fully or partially individuated node
at any one time. This principle is demonstrated
to hold across various structures and languages.
However, we will argue here that this constraint is
not only not specific to some presumed “language
faculty”, but that it is more general even than hu-
man cognitive capacities, being grounded within
the core physical laws underlying the behaviour of
complex systems. With this reducibility of a pu-
tative NL-exclusive structure-inducing constraint
to wholly general principles, we will argue that
indeed defining NL capacities in dynamic terms
fits the REEC perspective in which all aspects of
cognition are seen as grounded in action without
essential invocation of brain-internal mental repre-
sentations.
2 Structure-inducing constraints on path
traversals: tree structures
The set of affordances in a context are perceived
differentially by each agent or group of agents
depending on their level of attunement, their
skills and abilities, regarding the relevant prac-
tices that constitute the source of such affordances.
Available affordances will also be partitioned and
ranked depending on the concerns and purposes
of the agents involved (agent-relevant affordances
are called ‘solicitations’, Rietveld et al., 2018; Bru-
ineberg et al., 2018). Such demarcated so-called
‘fields of affordances’ are represented in DS by the
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T0
T2
mak
e UN
FIXE
D nod
e [.5]
T3
make SUBJECT-node [.3]
T4
make LINKed-node [.2]
T5
who
T9
who
abortabort
“who”
T7
..., pointermove, ...
T10
make LINKed-node [.8]
T11
...
T12
...
...
T13
hugged
abort
“hugged”
Figure 1: DAG:Who hugged
?Ty(t); Tn(a);} :::*Adjunction::: !
?Ty(t); Tn(a)
h"iTn(a);}
Figure 2: Introducing an “unfixed” node
?Ty(t); Tn(a)
h"iTn(a);}
:::who::: !
?Ty(t)
WH : e;}
h"iTn(0)
Figure 3: who-induced actions
time-linear unfolding of the DAG during conversa-
tional interaction, see Fig. 1 (see also Sato, 2011;
Eshghi et al., 2013; Hough and Purver, 2012).1
Focussing attention at the local level of DAG
nodes (ICSs), the first step is to consider the
mapping between a string of words, in DS, a
sequence of triggers for macros, and the DAG-
transformations that it induces. The specialised
PDL backbone of DS operates by means of pre-
diction of available open paths of development
constrained by so-called requirements (these are
indicated by ? appearing in front of any avail-
able grammatical action). The constraints thus in-
duced by the grammar (and other contextual fac-
tors) define a range of goals for the next steps
of processing. Agents attuned to the grammati-
cal practices available in a particular context can
pursue the most relevant goal defined in this con-
text guided by a process of affordance competition
(Cisek and Thura, 2019). For example, a poten-
tial starting point of such a process can be a node
state as displayed in Fig 2. Here we find the indi-
cator of the current focus of attention, the pointer
}, and a prediction reflecting the expectation that
a proposition (?Ty(t)) can be developed. This ex-
pectation will lead to many alternative predicted
paths of achieving this development that can be
1In order to simplify presentation, the available macros
have been significantly condensed and schematically men-
tioned through the more central effects they induce; ellipsis
(...) indicates that multiple steps have been omitted as they
have been judged as irrelevant to the point we wish to make.
displayed as shown in Fig 1. In Fig 2 we pursue
one of those paths, the topmost path in the DAG,
which is an option made available by the English
grammar: a macro called *Adjunction can intro-
duce a radically structurally underspecified (“un-
fixed”) node predicted to be needed to accommo-
date the processing of a content-underspecified el-
ement like who as seen in Fig 3. The latter pro-
cessed first in a sentence can end up in multiple
argument positions eventually so its contribution,
a metavariable notated as WH, needs to be held
in memory until a suitable place is found for it
later in the process. Therefore, the identification of
the node that accommodates the macro associated
with who does not specify immediate dominance
relations with respect to the root node, as shown
in the illustration, Fig. 2-3. This is indicated by
the dashed line. The underspecified relation is ex-
pressed via the modal operator h"i appearing in
front of the root node identifier, Tn(a) specifying
that the relation between the two nodes is one of
(non-immediate) dominance2.
As can be seen in the topmost path of the DAG,
eventually the verb hug will be processed and
its subject requirement will enforce the contribu-
tion of who to be specified as such. In DS this
means that the unfixed node will now become
fully specified with respect to all dominance rela-
tions. Once such a DAG path has been success-
2h"i is the modal operator expressing an immediate dom-
inance relation, h"i is the operator which, using the Kleene
* operator, expresses the weaker dominance relation.
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fully traversed, the state reached will record a tree-
structured topology of information with no words
left to be parsed/generated any more (see (Kemp-
son et al., 2001, 2016; Hough, 2015) for details).
The constraint on tree development which is
then proposed for all stages of every DS process is
that there be only one copy of any node at a partic-
ular DAG path. This is a general constraint which
follows from the logic of partial tree construction:
each node in a partial tree at any stage of the devel-
opment process has a unique identity with respect
to the other nodes. This restriction applies equally
to structurally underspecified nodes whose precise
position is yet to be established: any information
regarding the state identified as that unfixed node
that might be introduced at different stages of pro-
cessing is accumulated to constrain that particular
node. And until its tree-relative identification has
been updated to a more specific one no other node
can claim a similarly underspecified identification.
The effect is a “no-copy” principle for any node-
to-node transition.
2.1 Syntactic puzzles resolved
Since its first introduction, this novel dynamic of
processing incorporating parsing and generation
under the same formalism, hence intrinsically a
dialogue model (Eshghi et al., 2015), was first
applied to solve a number of puzzles concerning
syntactic and semantic/pragmatic phenomena as
well as their interaction. Such inclusivity, in our
view, is justified by the domain-generality of the
constraints proposed, which conventional frame-
works need to either set aside or address par-
tially by proposing additional auxiliary hypotheses
and language-particular stipulations, substantially
weakening the explanatory force of the approach.
The first such puzzle is very free word order-
ing, common across languages, which is gener-
ally problematic, as the default presumption of a
VP constituent does not apply in these languages.
Most striking is the verb-final language pattern, by
report the most common language pattern (Dryer,
2013). This is a phenomenon which at first sight
appears problematic for the DS framework as well.
In particular, in so far as these languages provide
sequences of noun phrases before some finally
placed verb, they often apparently allow all pos-
sible orderings of the arguments for that verb. So
they would seem to present immediate problems
for the commitment of incrementality taken by the
DS framework, as they would seem to warrant the
multiple introduction of unfixed nodes. Upon such
an analysis, such nodes would all need to be dis-
tinct, all free to occur in any order, all in some
sense having to wait for the verb in final position
from which the structure can be projected to con-
solidate their position in that emergent structure
(see (Pritchett, 1992) and others following):
(1) supai-ni
the spyDAT
syorui-o
the documentACC
zyaanarisuto-ga
the journalistNOM
watasita
handed [Japanese]
The journalist handed the document to the spy
But this is precisely what the “no more than
one” such characterised node at a time restriction
precludes. However, as argued in (Kempson and
Kiaer, 2010), there is a simple solution to this
challenge. For example, in Japanese and many
other languages, it is the case-suffix whose pro-
cessing determines the appropriate precisification
of the tree relation. So case morphology, under
this view, has a crucial processing and semantic
purpose, the introduction and restriction of further
possibilities of action, instead of just being seen
as a feature-matching reflex of some overarching
syntactic structure.
The process of structuring the emergent DAG
is then one of introducing an unfixed node accom-
modating the contribution of the nominal content,
with an immediate update step enriching that struc-
ture to provide a node commensurate with what
the case-marking dictates, thereby enabling the in-
troduction again of an unfixed node, without any
duplication at any particular stage of a tree-node
identification. An entirely similar analysis applies
to Korean (Kiaer, 2007). This approach is notably
confirmed by experimental work establishing the
incremental nature of Japanese sentence process-
ing (Witzel and Witzel, 2016).3
2.2 Morpho-syntactic puzzles resolved
This dynamic applies with equal force in the
morpho-syntax arena, indeed as expected given
that lexical processing capacities are taken to be
due to routinisations (macros) established over an
extended period. The very same pattern of analy-
sis is taken to apply to the puzzle facing analyses
of clitic clustering, where arbitrary lexical gaps in
the paradigm are attested. A well-known such case
3See also (Kiaer, 2007, 2014) for extensive discussion and
experimental evidence from Korean.
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is the Person Case Constraint (PCC; Perlmutter,
1970; Bonet i Alsina, 1991), which, in its standard
variant, states that a dative clitic cannot co-occur
with a 1st/2nd person accusative clitic:
(2) *Le
himCL DAT
me
meCL
ha
has
dado
given
‘S/He has given me to him.’ [Spanish]
The restriction on unfixed nodes, namely the fact
that no more than one treenode with the same
address is possible, gives us a natural explana-
tion of the PCC effects. The explanation is strik-
ingly straightforward from a DS perspective: da-
tive clitics are underspecified in general. In Ro-
mance, this underspecified nature of the dative
can be traced back to Latin, where dative mark-
ing is notoriously ambiguous (van Hoeke, 1996),
this a general problem with dative case-labelling.
In and of itself, that is, dative does not deter-
mine a fixed hierarchical position in the structure.
Similar diachronic considerations also apply for
other languages that show the same PCC effects,
e.g. Greek (Chatzikyriakidis, 2010; Chatzikyri-
akidis and Kempson, 2011). Given this underspec-
ification of the dative, the plausible assumption to
make is that dative clitics are processed on an un-
fixed node, so as to allow variant interpretations
of the dative. Furthermore, 1st and 2nd person
accusative clitics in Spanish and many other Ro-
mance languages are syncretized with the dative,
i.e. the same morphological form is used for both
the 1st and 2nd person accusative, as well as the
1st and 2nd person dative clitics. Thus, 1st and 2nd
person accusative clitics can also be taken as un-
derspecified and processed on an unfixed node too.
Now, given the “no copy” constraint, any combi-
nation of a dative clitic with a 1st or 2nd person
accusative clitic will be disallowed as two unfixed
nodes cannot be introduced at a single stage of pro-
cessing and, as a result, the incompatible informa-
tion from the two types of clitics on a single node
will lead to anomaly. 3rd person accusative cli-
tics, to the contrary, are not syncretized with the
dative and, furthermore, always interpreted as di-
rect objects. In DS terms, this means that they are
processed within a fully specified structure, rather
than on an unfixed node. Thus, the “no copy”
constraint does not interfere with the processing
of combinations of a dative and a 3rd person ac-
cusative clitic. There are a number of variants of
the PCC, e.g. the weak PCC version, which al-
lows combinations of 1st and 2nd person pronoun
clitics, but this variability has been shown to be af-
forded by the formal machinery of the system as
well (Chatzikyriakidis and Kempson, 2011).
The significance of these results, here of syntac-
tic and morphosyntactic type, is that these are ob-
servable low-level NL-particular facts apparently
warranting complex and unavoidable stipulation in
distinct components of the grammar. Current indi-
vidualistic linguistic theories justify this split on
the basis of notions like competence-performance,
modularity (Fodor, 1983), and Marrian compu-
tational vs algorithmic level distinctions (Marr,
1982; Steedman, 2000; Kobele, 2012). Within
the DS framework, in contrast, these patterns are
seen to fall out in virtue of modelling syntax
as the progressive structuring of the landscape
of affordances for interpretation and production
in everyday human interaction. Such normative
morphosyntactic constraints become historically
sedimented into practices routinising the most
frequently taken up processing paths (macros),
whether as a parser or a producer. Being norma-
tive constraints, such macros are necessarily in-
dependent from individual NL users and they are
potentially inadequately grasped by the skill level
(attunement, ‘abilities’) and concerns of individ-
ual agents. Hence the potential for innovation
and change as well as flexibility and adaptability.
Nevertheless, the availability of such macros in a
practice-sharing ‘form of life’ allows agent coordi-
nation due to their operation as joint relevant affor-
dances (‘solicitations’).
3 NL affordance competition
There is a range of approaches within REEC usu-
ally grounded within dynamical systems models
of socio-cognitive phenomena (Chemero, 2009).
Most of those espouse non-representational ac-
counts of perception and action, so-called “lower
cognition” or “basic minds”. However, even ad-
vocates of radical enactive perspectives stop short
from extending this approach to “higher order”
cognition, especially language (see e.g. Clark,
2016; Hutto and Myin, 2012). Moreover, even
accounts that aim to develop NL models com-
patible with dynamical and complex systems ap-
proaches like connectionism, due to the indi-
vidualistic perspective they adopt, suggest that
neural network implementations strengthen the
competence/performance distinction and support
the emergent nature of symbolic representations
(Prince and Smolensky, 1997). Against this view,
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REEC researchers (Rietveld et al., 2018; Bru-
ineberg et al., 2018; Paolo et al., 2018) aim to in-
tegrate all levels of cognitive activity within the
enactive approach. DS sides with the latter view
in that the constraints defined through the logic
underlying the framework constitute additional af-
fordances available in the sociomaterial environ-
ment of human interactions and are not confined
within individual brain structures. DS constraints
concern the process of comprehension/production
in a social context as aspects of general percep-
tion/action mechanisms defined via sensorimotor
loops that do not necessarily engage representa-
tional constructs (even though reification of such
subprocesses and representational abstraction is
also considered possible). Under such a view,
all grammatical dependencies are able to func-
tion as word-by-word incremental coordinating de-
vices, i.e., affordances, see, e.g. (3) - (4) for ei-
ther interlocutor (Gregoromichelaki et al., 2011,
2013a). This is possible and efficient irrespective
of whether or not coherent units like standard rep-
resentational constructs like ‘sentences’ or ‘propo-
sitions’ are ever derived or not:
(3) Hester: It’s for me.
Mrs Elton: And Mr Page?
Hester: is not my husband. [The Deep Blue Sea (film)]
(4) A: SOMEONE is keen
B: says the man who slept here all night
[BBC Transcripts A-Word]
Instead of propositional knowledge of rules and
manipulation of representations, the abilities of be-
ing able to interact through such grammatical con-
straints could then be characterised as subpersonal
mechanisms allowing access to a normative land-
scape of affordances that induces predictive goals
(solicitations) to be fulfilled by either interlocutor
in the very next steps which they will be taking.
The skills required to take advantage of solicita-
tions in such a context does not presuppose any
‘rational’ high-order individualistic inference, stan-
dardly taken to be the basis of all successful hu-
man communication( Clark (1996); Sperber and
Wilson (1995) and many others). Instead, the task
of selecting appropriate actions is taken over by af-
fordance competition (Cisek and Thura, 2019; An-
derson, 2014; Rietveld et al., 2018). However, this
presupposes that not only does the grammar incor-
porate processing features like incrementality and
predictivity but also that the grammar provides a
shared “workspace” (Kempen, 2014) for both pro-
duction and comprehension to operate and interact
(Gregoromichelaki et al., 2013b).
In addition, non-linguistic practices need to
be integrated with linguistic actions to contribute
their qualitatively identical types of constraints
(Gregoromichelaki, 2018). Evidence that mor-
phosyntax directly interacts with embodied situa-
tional affordances of every day action comes from
elliptical constructions. For example, in case-rich
languages such as German and Greek, elliptical
fragments necessarily display the form suitable to
what might have been a complete sentence for-
mulated in response, even when there is no obvi-
ous antecedent of a verbal sentential form– in the
German example in (5) the accusative form den
Arzt seamlessly blends with other situational affor-
dances to constrain future action to the effect that
someone should call a doctor:
(5) A and B see a woman lying on the floor:
A to B: Schnell, den Arzt/#der Arzt
Quick, the doctorACC /#the doctorNOM
The question that then remains is how to
think of alleged sui-generis properties of NL mor-
phosyntax that have been adduced as arguments
for claims like “the autonomy of syntax” hypothe-
sis. Within DS, this question is pertinent regarding
the status claimed universal NL constraints like
the “no-copy” restriction. While this remains an
issue for much further development, we suggest
that, within a domain-general framework like DS,
there are grounds for seeing this restriction as a
general control property of socio-cognitive coor-
dination systems (control in the cybernetic sense
of ‘regulation’, e.g. Bickhard (2009); Carver and
Scheier (2012)) and, therefore, indeed a general
property of physical systems.
Anderson (2014), like DS, attributes to individ-
ual brain mechanisms the role of action control
functions (‘abilities’) via perception/action feed-
back loops without necessary representational me-
diation. The brain is modelled as a connection-
ist network inspired by (Smolensky, 1986)’s archi-
tecture but without the individualistic representa-
tional interpretation. The state transitions and at-
tractor landscapes of this network control the inter-
action of the individual and the environment with-
out presuming that the brain constructs a model
of the world it interacts with. Like REEC’s view
of skills, abilities, and dispositions, the contribu-
tion of the individual brain is seen as complemen-
tary to the roles of the whole body and the envi-
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ronment and, on its own, in no way able to sus-
tain conceptually-transparent reactions to the envi-
ronment. Accordingly, the states that the network
passes through are not assigned representational
contents but are individuated by their responsive-
ness to particular inputs and behaviours that they
enable. As part of the control of behavior architec-
ture, different patterns of activation at each state
track the convergence of the control mechanism
towards a particular action.
What is important for us here is that affor-
dance competition in Anderson’s interpretation
is implemented by the fact that neural patterns
of activation might reflect simultaneously multi-
ple partially-activated options before final conver-
gence to the selected action goal. However, at the
update stage of convergence (i.e. when a “deci-
sion” has been reached), the partial specifications
of multiple action goals will be necessarily elim-
inated if their full activation patterns are incom-
patible, i.e., if they require the same brain regions.
We suggest that the ‘no-copy’ constraint on LOFT
tree-path traversals is of the same type and aetiol-
ogy: LOFT imposes a restricted architectural ca-
pacity to accommodate selected action opportuni-
ties. For example, an ‘unfixed node’ state can ac-
commodate multiple affordances, in the case of
Greek clitics, gender, person, number specifica-
tions, etc. However, any treenode annotations on
the DAG, including unfixed nodes, is the outcome
of the convergence of affordance competition. For
this reason, annotation of action goals is the equiv-
alent of fully-specified activation patterns which
cannot occupy overlapping brain regions. Simi-
larly, in DS, a node can only accommodate com-
patible selections of multiple macros as require-
ments for further update. If incompatible macros
come to be associated with the same node the re-
sult will be anomaly because there is no possibility
of pursuing the action paths indicated as subgoals
from that specific starting point. So in both cases,
affordance competition is the underlying cause for
action selection, action control and limitation with
NL constraints being subsumed under an overall
behaviour-guidance and general systems-control
architecture.
In closing, we note that, besides morphosyntax,
a further integral task in this program is captur-
ing the enormous range of interpretations which
words display, a challenge often treated as periph-
eral. Current work on the adoption of a vector-
based semantics for the affordances words provide
is ongoing, with the goal of modelling the perva-
sive variability of word meaning. This approach
builds on previous work on compositional dis-
tributional semantics for pregroup grammars and
the Lambek Calculus (Coecke et al., 2010, 2013),
and for Combinatory Categorial Grammar (CCG)
(Maillard et al., 2014; Moot, 2018). There is cur-
rent work in this area, where distributional mean-
ings of words are combined with their grammati-
cal types, albeit more informally (e.g. Baroni and
Zamparelli (2010)), but these do not consider an
incremental setting with underspecified nodes in
the grammatical construction, a challenge which
our program addresses. Purver et al. (forthcoming)
suggest two distributional counterparts to under-
specificational notions, and present experimental
results regarding affordance competition that re-
sults in optimal choice in the disambiguation task.
4 Conclusion
The shift of emphasis from static structural gen-
eralisations to actions is central here. The goal
is not to generate a sentence structure or proposi-
tion as such: it is to promote progressive context-
updates yielding further affordances guided by the
various practices constraining and enabling the
actions of the interlocutors. Given the domain-
generality of the DS architecture, constraints aris-
ing from non-verbal practices blend seamlessly
with morpho-syntactic and semantic constraints.
Context-updates thus follow constrained trajecto-
ries modelled as graph-transitions of restricted for-
mats, with an intermediate level of tree-structured
paths that account for morphosyntactic constraints
in an incremental manner due to various types of li-
censed underspecification. Due to the initial avail-
ability of various options for update and subse-
quent incremental culling as constraints accumu-
late from various sources and at various stages, a
process of affordance competition emerges as the
action selection mechanism. It is notable that this
mechanism applies across sources of constraints
bridging the levels of both “lower-” and “high-
level” cognition.
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